  to urlLink Tim makes a quick, but interesting comment about compatibilism; for those out of the philosophical loop, its the view that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. People who have seen the matrix may rail against this view, but i've always thought that it had some merit.
Now Tim makes part of the argument for me when he says that both free will and determinism need clarification. how can these beliefs be nonmutually exclusive? well, what is free will? I don't really accept the definition that a choice is when things might have been otherwise except for my choice. For example, Let's take Demi McDemocrat. Demi is a party line democrat, will only vote for democrats, and will only support Democrat platform issues. in the next election, she clearly CAN chose to vote republican, as in, she has the ability to do so, in an alternate (sorry Tim) universe, she might have voted for the republican (if, in Kripean style, identity flows across modal realities.
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.eer possiblilites, or whatever you want to call them) but in this-- the G reality-- I can predict with absolute certainty that she will vote for a democrat. A determinist might say that in this reality, jordan has defined Demi such that she will do so, and, similar to reality, the sum total of her identity forces her to vote in such a way. and, in reality, a determinist might say, that's how free will actually works: our identies, who we are, determines what we chose, and then, a stricter determinst might continue, we can see what causes those identies--- laws of physics, genetics, and biochemistry, whathave you.
So, how to compatibalize these two views? well, i remember reading an article in my Metaphysics 101 class that had an interesting viewpoint-- i forget who wrote it, but they said that free will is when Second Order Volitions determine first order volitions-- that is to say, what i actually choose is irrelevant. A second order volition is a desire to be the type of person who desires X--- so if i have a second order volition to be law abiding, i want to be the type of person who wants to obey the law. the first order volition is wanting to obey the law. Free will, then, is when my second order volitions can lead to my first order volitions--- so if my wanting to be a law abiding type can lead to my actually being law abiding.
notice that a determinist might say that second order volitions are just as suceptible to physics, genetics and biochemistry. but at this point it no longer matters--- the idea is that free will is created by second order volitions ruling first order volitions. Also notice that this can be easily turned into a more Kantian vision of free will--- men are free willed because we can act upon our principles (although there is an important distinction between principles and second order volitions).
A few more notes on compatiblism: 1) perhaps this leaves room for my favorite topic (which i posted about a few days ago) the mystic/rational distinction--- in so far as we are free willed, rational creatures, we have choice, but there is an important way in which we are fated, or determined, to act in certain ways. God at work? that opens a whole new can of worms. 2) i'm not really sure if this compatiblism actually works.
It seems to me that there needs to be a whole lot more clarification of why choice is actually the link between first and second order volitions, rather than just an ability to do either/or of 2 different actions, although it seems like it might be a reasonable approximation of the same thing. i also really enjoyed urlLink Lauren's most recent post about law, justice, et. al but i hesitate to post on it, since she quarterfinals at stanford shalacked me and nick with a case that used much of the same logic. 
